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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)' was passed in 1925 to
ensure the enforceability of arbitration clauses and codify the pro-
cedures through which such clauses would be enforced.2 Ever
since its passage, state courts and legislatures have attempted to
define the role that remains for state arbitration law in light of
the Act's sweeping provisions The dimensions of this role were
sharply narrowed in a trilogy of opinions by the U.S. Supreme
Court.4 These opinions broadened the scope of the FAA, perhaps
beyond that which Congress originally intended,' and established
the FAA as a body of substantive federal law that preempts all
contradictory state arbitration law.6
This broad interpretation of the FAA has been a source of
controversy within the Supreme Court, among various federal
courts, and between federal and state courts. The case which de-
fined the preemptory effect of the FAA, Southland Corp. v.
Keating,7 revealed disagreement among the Justices over the
FAA's preemptory force. Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist strong-
ly dissented, arguing that the majority opinion "utterly fail[ed] to
1. Ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-08 (1994)).
2. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1984).
3. See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATION-
ALIZATION, AND INTERNATIONALIZATION 127-30 (1992) (discussing state cases applying
the FAA after the Act's passage); see also Voters Said Yes to Amendments, But Court
Will Have the Last Word, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 19, 1996, at 14B (discussing
Nebraska's struggle with arbitration laws).
4. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489-91 (1987); Southland, 465 U.S. at 10-12;
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
5. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 845-50 (1995) (Thom-
as, J., dissenting); Perry, 482 U.S. at 493 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Southland, 465 U.S. at
25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
6. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 15-16. Preemption occurs by virtue of Congress' pow-
er under the Commerce Clause. See id. at 11-16.
7. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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recognize the clear congressional intent underlying the FAA."'
Congress' intent, according to the dissenting Justices, was "to
require federal, not state, courts to respect arbitration agree-
ments."9 Although Justice O'Connor has not dissented in more
recent opinions considering the preemptory effect of the FAA,
she has stated that she remains convinced that "Congress never
intended the Federal Arbitration Act to apply in state courts."'"
Justices Scalia and Thomas have also vigorously dissented in opin-
ions considering the scope of Southland, calling the Southland
decision simply "wrong."' 2 Justice Scalia has expressed his opin-
ion that "Southland clearly misconstrued the Federal Arbitration
Act"" and has declared his readiness "to join four other Justices
in overruling it."'4 Thus, the controversy over the FAA and the
Southland decision persists in the Supreme Court.
The effect of Southland and its progeny on state law has also
opened a rift between some state and federal courts." This rift
was most clearly illustrated by Circuit Judge Bruce H. Selya, writ-
ing for the First Circuit. 6 In Securities Industry Association v.
Connolly, Judge Selya bemoaned state resistance to the FAA and
argued that the Act was "therapy for the ailment of the crowded
docket .... [But as] might be expected . . . the patient, and
others in interest, often resist the treatment.' 17
One such "patient," Justice Terry N. Trieweiler of the Su-
preme Court of Montana, responded in an opinion that "[such]
arrogance not only reflects an intellectual detachment from reality,
8. Id. at 22-23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 23.
10. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
11. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 844 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice O'Connor has stated she will acquiesce in majority opinions in defer-
ence to stare decisis until there is a "'special justification' to overrule Southland." Id.
(citing Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
12. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
13. kd (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14. Id.
15. The rift has also opened between some state courts and legislatures. For exam-
ple, Nebraska courts have long held arbitration provisions relating to future disputes
unenforceable under the Nebraska Constitution. See Nebraska v. Nebraska Ass'n of Pub.
Employees, 477 N.W.2d 577, 582 (Neb. 1991). This sentiment was shared neither by the
Nebraska legislature nor by the state's citizens; this past summer the citizens of Nebraska
passed a constitutional amendment authorizing arbitration in all circumstances. See Voters
Said Yes to Amendments, But Court Will Have the Last Word, supra note 3, at 14B.
16. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989).
17. Id. at 1116.
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but a self-serving disregard for the purposes for which courts ex-
ist."'" In the same opinion, Justice Trieweiler and three other
state supreme court justices upheld Montana's arbitration law,
resisting "treatment."' 9 The U.S. Supreme Court later reversed
the Montana Court without addressing any of Justice Trieweiler's
concerns. In "symbolic protest," Justice Trieweiler refused to
sign the Supreme Court's remand order.2'
Despite the sweep of the FAA, states do have a role in the
creation of arbitration law. In fact, this role should satisfy Justice
Trieweiler. This Note explores, in light of Southland and the more
recent Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,2" the role that re-
mains for state arbitration law.' In particular, this Note argues
that state law of contract formation can be used to protect individ-
uals from unfair arbitration agreements without running afoul of
the FAA.
Part I of this Note outlines the history of the FAA and ana-
lyzes the cases that have expanded the Act's scope. Part II
evaluates the split among circuits over the role of state contract
law under the FAA. Part II argues that state, not federal, law
should govern formation questions and concludes that state courts
and legislatures can regulate arbitration provisions-in a manner
consistent with the FAA and Southland-by revising their laws of
contract formation. Part III analyzes Justice Trieweiler's contro-
18. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 940 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., specially
concurring), vacated and remanded 115 S. Ct. 2552 (1995), reaffd and reinstated 901 P.2d
596 (Mont. 1995), rev'd 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996). Justice Trieweiler added that Judge
Selya's opinion illustrated "an all too frequent preoccupation on the part of federal judg-
es with their own case load and a total lack of consideration for the rights of individu-
als." Id.
19. See id. at 939.
20. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1656-57 (1996) (holding
that Montana's law directly conflicts with the FAA because it conditions the enforce-
ability of arbitration agreements on compliance with a special notice requirement not
applicable to contracts generally).
21. See Richard C. Reuben, Western Showdown: Two Montana Judges Buck the U.S.
Supreme Court, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1996, at 16 (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky).
22. 116 S. CL 1652 (1996).
23. This Note will not examine the soundness of Southland and its progeny. There is
a rich body of literature on that subject. See, e.g., Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Ar-
bitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305 (1985);
Janet M. Grossnickle, Note, Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson: How the Federal Arbi-
tration Act Will Keep Consumers and Corporations Out of the Courtroom, 36 B.C. L.
REV. 769 (1995); David P. Pierce, Comment, The Federal Arbitration Act: Conflicting
Interpretations of Its Scope, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 623 (1992).
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versial opinion in Casarotto v. Lombardi24 and the Supreme
Court's response. Part IV then examines how the question in
Casarotto might be restated as one of contract formation, such
that the result in Casarotto can be seen as one consistent with
Southland.
I. HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION AcT
Arbitration is a process that allows parties to "voluntarily
refer their disputes to an impartial third person, an arbitrator, se-
lected by them for a decision based on the evidence and argu-
ments to be presented before the arbitration tribunal."'  Unlike
judicially enforced dispute resolution, arbitration is voluntary and
can be imposed only when all parties agree to its use.26 Many
contracting parties stipulate that disputes arising from their con-
tracts will be referred to an arbitrator because arbitration allows
parties to settle their disputes in an "inexpensive and speedy"
fashion and to pick the presiding judge.27
Despite the consensual nature and apparent ease of arbitra-
tion, courts historically have been reluctant to enforce arbitration
agreements.' Lackluster enforcement of arbitration agreements
has been attributed to the jealous guard courts keep over their ju-
risdiction29 and to some courts' reluctance to specifically enforce
arbitration agreements3 Because of this weak enforcement, indi-
24. 886 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1994), vacated and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 2552 (1995); reaff'd
and reinstated 901 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
25. MARTIN DOMKE, 1 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1:01 (1996).
26. See id.
27. Id. (quoting Gates v. Arizona Brewing Co., 95 P.2d 49, 50 (Ariz. 1939)).
28. See DOMKE, supra note 25, § 3.01; see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
1, 13-14 (1984) (reviewing the legislative history behind the FAA and noting the unwill-
ingness of state courts to enforce arbitration agreements). For an early history of arbitra-
tion, see Hirshmnan, supra note 23, at 1309-14.
29. See H.R. REP. No. 96-68, at 1-2 (1924). The House Report specified that the
need for the Federal Arbitration Act
arises from ... the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdic-
tion .... This jealousy survived for so long a period that the principle became
firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it by the
American courts. The courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed
to be overturned without legislative enactment ....
Id.
30. See Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 6 (1923) (remarks of Sen. Walsh); see also S.M. Wolff Co. v.
Tulkoff, 174 N.E.2d 478, 480 (N.Y. 1961) ("At common law, 'Arbitration agreements ...
meant very little' because they were not subject to specific enforcement." (quoting In re
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viduals who explicitly desired and contracted for arbitration were
left unsure if the arbitration provisions agreed to in their contracts
would be enforced.
In response to this lackluster enforcement3 and the need for
contractual certainty, 2 Congress passed the FAA in 1925.' The
Act mandated enforcement of arbitration clauses contained in all
contracts involving maritime transactions or interstate com-
merce.34 The Act also contained procedural provisions that em-
powered courts35 to stay proceedings until the close of arbitra-
tion36 or to compel arbitration 7 With these provisions, Congress
Feuer Transp., Inc., 65 N.E.2d 178, 180 (N.Y. 1946))).
31. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 838 (1995) ("IT]he
basic purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is to overcome courts' refusals to enforce
agreements to arbitrate."); see also Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271
F.2d 402, 406-07 (2d Cir. 1959) (holding that "[f]or a considerable time prior to the pas-
sage of the Arbitration Act in 1925 the Congress had come to the conclusion that an ef-
fort should be made . . . to remove the hostility of the judiciary and make the benefits
of arbitration generally available to the business world.").
32. See Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d
Cir. 1961) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring) ("[T]he purpose of the [FAA] was to assure those
who desired arbitration and whose contracts related to interstate commerce that their
expectations would not be undermined by federal judges, or. . .by state courts or leg-
islatures.").
33. Arbitration Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-16, 201-208 (1994)).
34. See 9 U.S.C. § 2. This section provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole
or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an ex-
isting controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id.
35. The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether §§ 3 and 4 of the FAA, the
procedural provisions, apply to state courts. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 n.6 (1989) ("While we have
held that the FAA's 'substantive' provisions-§§ 1 and 2-are applicable in state as well
as federal court ... we have never held that §§ 3 and 4, which by their terms appear
to apply only to proceedings in federal court ... are nonetheless applicable in state
court."); cf. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26
(1983) (stating in dictum that "state courts, as much as federal courts, are obliged to
grant stays of litigation under § 3 of the Arbitration Act"). The question of whether § 3
and § 4 are applicable to state courts is outside of the scope of this Note.-For a detailed
discussion of that topic, see Jon R. Schumacher, Note, The Reach of the Federal Arbitra-
tion AcL Implications on State Procedural Law, 70 N.D. L. REV. 459 (1994).
36. See 9 U.S.C. § 3.
37. See 9 U.S.C. § 4.
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intended to create "a national policy favoring arbitration and [to
withdraw] the power of the states to require a judicial forum for
the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to re-
solve by arbitration."38
This intended policy of the FAA was thwarted for many
years, in part, by the perceived limited scope of the Act. 9 The
FAA did not specify whether it was procedural or substantive in
nature, or if its parts were severable.' Most commentators be-
lieved the FAA had force only in federal courts,4' and in the
decades after its passage, only federal courts 'deferred to the
FAA.42 Moreover, for twenty years following its passage, no re-
ported state case even considered applying the FAA in a state
proceeding.43
The Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins' forced courts to consider the precise contours of the
FAA45 -whether the Act's requirements were procedural (and
therefore applicable in federal diversity cases), substantive (and
inapplicable in diversity cases), or something altogether differ-
ent.4' This consideration of the FAA in light of Erie's holding
did not begin, however, until nearly thirty years after the deci-
38. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
39. See MACNEiL, supra note 3, 122-24.
40. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24; see also Schumacher, supra
note 35, at 476-77 (discussing whether §§ 3 and 4 of the FAA are binding on state
courts and the impact of severing §§ 1 and 2 of the FAA from §§ 3 and 4).
41. See Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate Commerce Re-
quirement: What's Left for State Arbitration Law? 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 391 (1992)
(citing Harry Baum & Leon Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration
Agreements in the Federal Courts, 8 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 238, 428, 430-31, 459-60
(1930-31)) ("Courts and commentators concluded, almost unanimously, that the Act ap-
plied in all federal cases .... Few if any commentators, meanwhile, thought that state
courts were obligated to apply the Act."); see also MACNEIL, supra note 3, at 122-24
(discussing commentaries published immediately following the passage of the FAA).
42. See MAcN~m, supra note 3, at 131-33; Strickland, supra note 41, at 391.
43. See MACNEt, supra note 3, at 127-28 (citing French v. Petrinovic, 54 N.Y.S.2d
179 (N.Y. App. Div. 1945), as the first decision in which a state court considered apply-
ing the FAA). In the "thirty-four years after its enactment, the [FAA] had yielded a
grand total of only five reported cases in which efforts had been made to have it applied
in state courts." Id. at 128.
44. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
45. For a discussion of the theoretical tensions between Erie and the FAA as it was
construed in 1938, see Strickland, supra note 41, at 391-95.
46. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (holding generally that there is no federal common law
and that federal courts must apply substantive state law in diversity cases).
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sion.47 The first significant post-Erie announcement of the FAA's
scope occurred in 1967, with the Supreme Court's decision in
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.8 In
Prima Paint, the Court found that the FAA was an exercise of
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause;49 the Act therefore
created a body of substantive federal fights, not mere federal
procedure.50 As a result, the Court held that the FAA was appli-
cable in all cases involving interstate commerce. 1
It was yet another twenty years, however, before the Court
defined the relationship between this federal law and state law 2
In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp.,53 the Court developed the general principle that ascribed
to Congress the intent to have the FAA "[create] a body of feder-
al substantive law." Furthermore, the Court held that the FAA
mandate[d] enforcement of all covered arbitration agreements;
Congress [could] hardly have meant that an agreement to arbi-
trate [could] be enforced against a party who attempts to litigate
an arbitrable dispute in federal court, but not against one who
sues on the same dispute in state court.55
Thus, the FAA appeared to apply in both state and federal courts.
This general principle was delineated one year later in
Southland Corporation v. Keating.6 In Southland, the Supreme
Court held that § 2 of the FAA-the mandatory enforcement
provision-was applicable in both state and federal courts.57 Fur-
47. See MACNEEL, supra note 3, at 136.
48. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). Ian Macneil argues that the Supreme Court's opinion in
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956), set the stage for Prima
Paint, but nevertheless concedes that "few knew what had hit them when Prima Paint
was decided." See MACNEiL, supra note 3, at 138. Thus, it is accurate to characterize
Prima Paint as the first consideration of the FAA in light of Erie. The gap in time be-
tween Erie and Prima Paint (or Bernhardt for that matter) can only be explained by the
"undiscussed and unstated assumption that state law governed" arbitration issues general-
ly. Id. at 138-39.
49. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404-05.
50. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983).
51. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405.
52. See MACNE L, supra note 3, at 134-48.
53. 460 U.S. 1.
54. Id. at 25 n.32.
55. Id. at 27 n.34.
56. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
57. See id. at 12.
658 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:651
ther, state statutes preventing the enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments were invalid under the Supremacy Clause. 8 The Court rea-
soned that, by passing the FAA, "Congress intended to foreclose
state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements."59 The preemptive effect of the FAA has been
affirmed in subsequent Supreme Court decisions.'
The Southland Court did identify two limits on the enforce-
ability of arbitration clauses: "[the clauses] must be part of a
written maritime contract or a contract 'evidencing a transaction
involving commerce' and such clauses may be revoked upon such
'grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."' 61 Following Southland, litigants who wanted to resist
arbitration under the FAA urged courts to give effect to the first
limit.62 They argued that § 2 of the FAA specified that the Act
applies only to arbitration provisions "in any maritime transaction
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce."' 3
They then argued that their particular contract fell outside of the
scope of the FAA because the contract did not involve interstate
commerce. However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument
58. See id. at 16. The conflicting state law in Southland was the California Franchise
Investment Law. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31,000 et seq. (West 1977). One section of that
statute provided that "[a]ny condition, stipulation or provision purporting to bind any
person acquiring any franchise'to waive compliance with any provision of this law or any
rule or order hereunder is void." CAL. CORP. CODE § 31,512. Because the statute had
the effect of preventing arbitration of claims brought under the franchise law, it conflict-
ed with the FAA. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
59. Id.
60. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 837-38 (1995) (hold-
ing that the FAA preempts a state law making written, pre-dispute arbitration agreements
invalid and unenforceable); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987) (invalidating a
section of the California Labor Code which effectively foreclosed arbitration by requiring
litigants to seek a judicial forum for resolving wage disputes).
There are some indications, however, that even a slight change in the makeup of
the. Supreme Court could lead the Court to overrule Southland and its progeny. See
supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
61. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10-11 (citations omitted).
62. See, eg., Dobson, 115 S. Ct. at 843 (rejecting the argument that the termite-con-
trol contract at issue involved interstate commerce); Lacheney v. Profitkey Int'l, Inc., 818
F. Supp. 922, 923-24 (E.D. Va. 1993) (finding a personal service contract performed in
Virginia involved interstate commerce); Burke County Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver
Partnership, 279 S.E.2d 816, 819 (N.C. 1981) (holding an architectural contract involved
interstate commerce); see also Strickland, supra note 41, at 386, 400-406 (arguing that
determining the FAA's applicability has increased in importance and examining the scope
of the FAA's applicability).
63. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (emphasis added).
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and the idea that the commerce requirement provided any real
limit on the scope of the FAA in Allied-Bruce Tenninix Cos. v.
Dobson.'
Dobson involved the arbitration provision of a "Termite Pro-
tection Plan" contract between an Alabama homeowner and the
local Terminix franchise ("Terminix").' When the homeowner-
plaintiff discovered his house was still infested with termites after
Terminix had ostensibly exterminated them, he sued Terminix.66
Terminix moved to stay the proceedings pending arbitration.67
The Supreme Court, considering an appeal from the Alabama
Supreme Court's decision to refuse the stay, held that the
Terminix contract evidenced a "transaction involving commerce,"
and therefore was governed by the FAA.'
In so holding, the Court found that the phrase "involving
commerce" as used in the FAA was the functional equivalent of
the phrase "affecting commerce"; therefore, the FAA's language
signalled "congressional intent to exercise its Commerce Clause
powers to the full."'69 As a result, not "only persons or activities
within the flow of interstate commerce" fell within the FAA's
ambit, 0 but all persons and activities subject to the commerce
power generally. The Court justified this broad interpretation of
§ 2 as consistent with the Act's basic purpose:
[A] narrower interpretation [would not be] consistent with the
Act's purpose, for ... such an interpretation would create a
new, unfamiliar, test lying somewhere in a no-man's land be-
tween "in commerce" and "affecting commerce," thereby unnec-
essarily complicating the law and breeding litigation from a stat-
ute that seeks to avoid it.71
Thus, the Court effectively eliminated the first and most obvious
limitation on the FAA's preemptive effect.
64. 115 S. Ct. at 839-40.
65. See Id. at 837.
66. See Id.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 843.
69. Id. at 839.
70. Id. (quoting United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271,
276 (1975)).
71. Id. at 840.
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I1. STATE LAW OF CONTRACr FORMATION UNDER THE FAA
The FAA's far-reaching scope and its apparent lack of excep-
tions have led some commentators to argue that arbitration law
has been completely "federalized" and state arbitration law com-
pletely eviscerated. 2 Nevertheless, state law has been held to
govern a few limited questions of arbitration agreements. For
example, parties can 'contract out' of the FAA's mandates by
specifying that state arbitration rules will govern their arbitration
agreement.73 Such "contracting out" is justified because if parties
agree to "abide by state rules of arbitration," application of the
FAA "would be quite inimical to the FAA's primary purpose of
ensuring that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced accord-
ing to their terms."'74 While "contracting out" of the FAA allows
private parties to avoid the FAA's mandates, it does not solve the
concern of states. That is, the alternative of "contracting-out" is
available only in contract situations between individuals, the state
having no right of participation in nor control over the contract's
mandates. Yet the state has a legitimate interest in protecting its
citizens and, absent the use of "contracting out" provisions, a weak
party may still be subject to contracts of adhesion and may be
forced into a different, unwanted forum. "Contracting out" of the
FAA does not "de-federalize" arbitration law in any meaningful
way, since it does not explicitly provide states an active voice in
the creation of arbitration law.
That voice may, however, be found in the single remaining
textual exception to the FAA-the second limitation referred to in
the Southland opinion.' This exception provides that state arbi-
tration law may supersede the FAA in certain instances, namely
"upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract."'76 Arbitration clauses can be evaluated by state
courts in two instances: 1) to determine whether a valid arbitration
clause was formed by the parties (i.e., questions of contract forma-
tion); and 2) to determine what issues the parties agreed to ar-
bitrate (i.e., the scope of the agreed-upon arbitration). When eval-
72. See Hirshman, supra note 23, at 1305-08.
73. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478-79 (1989); see also supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
74. Id. at 479.
75. See 465 U.S. at 10-11 (1984).
76. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
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uating questions of formation, judges may consider "attacks on the
making of the agreement"-arguments that no contract was
formed-as well as arguments for revoking the contract, such as
laches, waiver and unconscionability. 7
A. Different Views of the Role of State Contract Law
At first, it appears unclear if it is state or federal law that
should govern questions of whether an agreement to arbitrate has
been formed. Federal courts do not agree on this issue. Some
circuits have held that questions of validity, enforceability and
revocability of an arbitration agreement are governed by federal,
not state, law. For example, in Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi &
Co.,78 the Second Circuit bound the parties to an arbitration
agreement that was printed on the back of a sales confirmation
form because, under general federal contract principles, "there was
an objective agreement with respect to the entire contract."79 This
rationale was offered despite contrary state law that would have
invalidated the arbitration provision as a material alteration of the
contract.0 Justifying this application of federal law, the Second
Circuit argued that the FAA was a large body of
national substantive law governing questions of the validity and
the enforceability of arbitration agreements under its cover-
age .... Hence whether [a party] is bound by the arbitration
77. See Hirshman, supra note 23, at 1336 n.183; see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S.
483, 492 n.9 (1987) (stating in dictum that the phrase "save upon such grounds" impli-
cates issues of an agreement's validity, as well as its revocability and enforceability);
Note, Erie, Bernhardt, and Section 2 of the United States Arbitration Act: A Farrago of
Rights, Remedies, and a Right to a Remedy, 69 YALE LJ. 847, 860 n.81 (1960) (interpret-
ing the term "revocation" in § 2 to mean "avoidance").
78. 815 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1987).
79. Id. at 846 (citing N & D Fashions, Inc. v. DIIJ Indus., Inc., 548 F.2d 722, 727
(8th Cir. 1976)). Cf. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1923-26
(1995) (applying state law of contract formation without invoking the § 2 exception);
Supak & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Pervel Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 135, 137 (4th Cir. 1979) (using
the "any contract" language rather than the exception language of § 2 for determining
the issue of whether a contract to arbitrate was formed, thereby classifying the issue as
determinable according to state law).
80. See, eg., Coastal Indus., Inc. v. Automatic Steam Prods. Corp. 654 F.2d 375,
378-79 (5th Cir. 1981) (analyzing the same question as in Genesco but applying New
York state law and reaching the opposite result). Under New York law, "an arbitration
clause constitutes a per se material alteration of a contract" for purposes of N.Y. U.C.C.
§ 2-207. Id. at 379 (citing Fairfield-Noble Corp. v. Pressman-Gutman Co., 475 F. Supp.
899, 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)).
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clause of [a contract] is determined under federal law, which
comprises generally accepted principles of contract law.8'
This view has been adopted by other courts in more recent cas-
es.8
Other circuits treat the question of whether an arbitration
clause is part of a contract as an issue of state law. For example,
the Fourth Circuit has held that whether an arbitration clause is
part of a contract, as required by § 2 of the FAA, is a question of
"state law on the general principles governing formation of the
contract itself."'  This finding-that state law of contract forma-
tion has a role under the FAA-has been subsequently affirmed
by the Fourth Circuits' and adopted by other circuits.'5
81. Genesco, 815 F.2d at 845 (emphasis added, citations omitted); see also Par-Knit
Mills, Inc. v. Stockbridge Fabrics Co., 636 F.2d 51, 54-55 (3d Cir. 1980) (evaluating a
question of contract formation generally within the framework of the FAA).
82. See, eg., Degaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1140, at *9-*10
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that courts must apply federal substantive law to determine
arbitrability); In re Milliken & Co., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11195, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
("[The Second Circuit has clearly stated that whether parties are bound by an arbitra-
tion clause under the FAA is determined by federal law, not state law."); see also Neal
v. Hardee's Food Sys. Inc., 918 F.2d 34, 37 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that federal
law governed the question of whether separate agreements should be construed together
to determine if an arbitration agreement had been formed); Mago v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that federal, not state law, gov-
erned the question of whether an arbitration agreement was an adhesion contract); Cohen
v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 285 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the
FAA is a single unified body of federal law that governs all defenses against the validity
of an arbitration agreement).
83. Supak & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Pervel Indus., 593 F.2d 135, 137 (4th Cir. 1979) (cit-
ing Duplan Corp. v. W. B. Davis Hosiery Mills, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
84. See, ag., Roddick v. Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 142, at *4
(4th Cir. 1993); W. M. Schlosser Co. v. School Bd., 980 F.2d 253, 258-59 (4th Cir. 1992)
(holding that federal courts cannot order parties to arbitrate if there is no valid arbitra-
tion agreement, and it is state law that governs whether a valid arbitration agreement has
been formed); see also Saturn Distrib. Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719, 723 (4th Cir.
1990) (holding that while the state law governing contract formation generally was valid
under the FAA, a state could not circumvent the FAA "by enacting special rules to
discourage or prohibit the formation of agreements to arbitrate").
Schlosser shows, however, that the Fourth Circuit has shifted its reasoning slightly.
Rather than justifying the application of state law of contract formation under the "any
contract" language of § 2 of the FAA, the court in Schlosser found that general rules of
contract formation are "a 'ground[] as exist[s] at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract,' within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. § 2." Schlosser, 980 F.2d at 259 (quoting 9
U.S.C. § 2 (1994)).
85. See Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883, 885-86 (8th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing questions
of contract formation governed by state law from other arbitration issues, but finding that
this case did not involve a question of contract formation); Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
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B. Arguing for the Application of State Contract Law Under the
FAA
The Fourth Circuit's reasoning-that state law of contract
formation should govern determinations of whether an arbitration
agreement has been formed-appears to be correct for several
reasons. First, contract law is typically the domain of the states.8 6
The existence of a federal common law of contract was rejected in
Erie;' indeed, the very concept of a "federal contract law" is
fairly amorphous.8 This is evident in Second Circuit opinions
dealing with the FAA, which cite various cases from throughout
the federal judiciary to support whatever proposition the court
may be trying to prove at the moment.8 9 Further, these courts
never define "federal contract law" nor attempt to justify its
use.
90
Second, courts cannot, consistently with the FAA, evaluate
arbitration provisions differently from other contractual provisions.
Evaluating arbitration agreements under federal law while evaluat-
ing all other contractual provisions under state law would place
the arbitration provision on footing different from the rest of the
contract; the arbitration provisions would receive preferential treat-
ment.9' Such unequal footing, however, frustrates one very impor-
Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1120-21 (1st Cir. 1989) (using the same analysis as Lee).
86. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (finding that
state contract law could not be displaced, even when the contract related to intellectual
property); see also Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 36 (1988) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("Issues of contract ... are nearly always governed by state law.").
87. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see also Jack B.
Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1, 20 (1988) ("Erie left to the states
much of the necessary modern private law development in torts and contracts through
case law and statutes and avoided the necessity of ad hoc decisions in this area by feder-
al courts not particularly well qualified to develop private substantive law.").
88. Even the Restatement, although persuasive, is not "law that judges have a duty to
uphold." STEVEN J. BURTON & MELVIN A. EISFNBERG, CONTRACr LAW SELECIED
SOURCE MATERiAL 3 (1996).
89. See g., Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiudhi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 845-46 (2d Cir.
1987) (citing various Eighth and Eleventh circuit opinions to define federal law of con-
tract formation).
90. See id; see also Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 934 (9th
Cir. 1992).
91. See Supak & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Pervel Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 135, 137 (4th Cir.
1979).
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
tant stated objective of the FAA-"to place [arbitration] agree-
ments 'upon the same footing as other contracts.'
92
Third, and perhaps most important, circuits that apply federal
law to discern if an arbitration agreement has been formed justify
this application on a fundamental misreading of Supreme Court
opinions. They confuse the issue of whether an arbitration clause
has been formed with the issue of the scope of the arbitration
agreement, that is, what issues the parties agreed to arbitrate.
These courts cite the Supreme Court's opinions in Prima Paint,93
Moses Cone,94 and Mitsubishi Motors Corp.95 to support their
application of federal law. However, these cases stand for the
proposition that questions concerning whether a certain dispute is
arbitrable under the terms of the arbitration agreement-the scope
of the arbitration agreement-is a question of federal law. None of
these opinions bear on the issue of how one should determine
whether an arbitration provision has been formed.
This misreading of the Supreme Court's FAA opinions may
explain why the Second Circuit has contradicted itself on occasion,
holding that state law of contract formation governed formation
questions.96 It may also explain why at least one district court
judge within the Second Circuit has considered the Circuit's argu-
ments and explicitly rejected them, choosing instead to apply state
law to formation questions.97
92. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511
(1974)).
93. See Genesco, 815 F.2d at 845 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967)).
94. See Neal v. Hardee's Food Sys. Inc., 918 F.2d 34, 37 n.5 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)).
95. Degaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1140, at *9-*10
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 626 (1985)).
96. See Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. C. A. Reaseguradora Nacional de Venezuela, 991
F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Perry v. Thomas ... dictates that we apply state law in
determining whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate." (citation omitted)). The Sec-
ond Circuit has since tried to re-characterize the opinion in Progressive Casualty. In a
subsequent case, the court characterized this opinion as standing for the proposition that
"[w]ere our jurisdiction predicated upon diversity, there might be an argument that we
should defer to the New York courts when construing the choice of law/forum provi-
sion." In re Salomon, Inc., 68 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Progressive Casualty,
991 F.2d at 46 n.6).
97. See Cook Chocolate Co. v. Salomon Inc., 684 F. Supp. 1177, 1181 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (noting that, although the Second Circuit has held that federal law governs the
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The Supreme Court has in fact indicated that state law should
govern formation and revocation questions. For example, in Perry
v. Thomas,98 the Court noted in dictum that "state law, whether
of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable [to resolving whether
grounds exist for the revocation of a contract] if that law arose to
govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and en-
forceability of contracts generally."99 Also, in Dobson,"° the
Court stated that § 2 of the FAA established that "[s]tates may
regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general con-
tract law principles."'1 ' And, even more recently, in Doctor's As-
sociates v. Casarotto,'O the Court definitively stated that "the
text of § 2 [of the FAA] declares that state law may be applied"
to determine questions of validity."°
The Court's most extensive examination of the role that state
contract law should play occurred in First Options of Chicago, Inc.
v. Kaplan."° First Options involved a "workout agreement" em-
bodied in four separate documents (for "working-out" debt)
among First Options, the Kaplans, and the Kaplans' wholly owned
investment company." When the Kaplans did not pay their debt
to First Options, the company demanded arbitration pursuant to
the workout agreement.' 6 However, the Kaplans had not person-
ally signed the document containing the arbitration provision and
denied that their dispute with First Options was arbitrable; the
Kaplans also denied that an arbitrator could decide whether the
dispute was arbitrable." The Court found that the question of
whether an arbitration provision was formed was really a question
of contract formation that should be resolved by reference to state
law.0 8 The relevant state law required the Court to "see whether
validity of arbitration agreements, that state law should nevertheless govern such ques-
tions).
98. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
99. Id. at 493 n.9 (emphasis added).
100. 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).
101. Id. at 843 (emphasis added).
102. 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
103. Id at 1656.
104. 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995).
105. See id. at 1922.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 1924.
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the parties objectively revealed an intent to submit the arbitrability
issue to arbitration."'1 9
As a result of these unambiguous statements by the Supreme
Court, courts should no longer disagree with the proposition that,
under the FAA, state law should be applied to resolve certain
limited questions."' No doubt, state law which specifically re-
stricts the enforceability of a valid arbitration agreement is still
preempted by § 2 of the FAA."' However, an arbitration agree-
ment must be valid for § 2 to apply."2 State contract law gov-
erns this preliminary question-whether a given arbitration provi-
sion is valid, i.e., part of a contract." Thus, the FAA allows the
use of state law to strike down arbitration agreements that would
otherwise be enforced under the FAA.114
This result is consistent with the Supreme Court's state-
ments." The Court has recognized that "[a] party may challenge
... arbitration.., including the nonexistence of a valid arbitra-
tion agreement," based on "contract and arbitration law.""16 Fur-
thermore, "arbitration is ... a matter of contract between the
parties." 117 Thus, "[w]hen deciding whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate a certain matter (including arbitrability), courts generally
... should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the
formation of contracts."" 8
109. Id. The Court then went on to consider the issue of who should decide the
question of arbitrability. See id. at 1924-5.
110. Nevertheless, some federal courts are still holding that federal contract law
should be applied to determine whether a valid arbitration agreement has been formed.
See McPheeters v. McGinn, Smith & Co., 953 F.2d 771, 772-73 (2d Cir. 1992); see also
supra note 82.
111. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1655 (1996); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
112. See Supak & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Pervel Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 135, 137 (4th Cir,
1979).
113. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 n.11 ("We agree, of course, that a party may
assert general contract defenses such as fraud to avoid enforcement of an arbitration
agreement.").
114. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04
(1967).
115. Cf. Pierce, supra note 23, at 645-48 (1992) (arguing that this is inconsistent with
the purpose of the FAA).
116. DoMKE, supra note 25, § 19.00, at 275.
117. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1924 (1995).
118. Id.
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C. Limits on the Application of State Contract Law
Given that state law should govern whether a valid arbitration
provision has been formed, the precise limits on a state's ability to
govern formation questions must be defined. There must be some
point at which state law is no longer a valid statement of contract
formation but becomes an invalid undercutting of the FAA. Other-
wise, states could simply pass laws prohibiting the "formation" of
arbitration clauses, completely eviscerating the FAA.
Although the Supreme Court has reached this issue only re-
cently,11 9 the touchstone seems to be the state law's level of gen-
erality. In Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,'" the Court not-
ed that any state law that "places arbitration agreements in a class
apart from 'any contract,' and singularly limits their validity" is
preempted by federal law.' Also, in Perry v. Thomas,12 the
Court noted in dictum that
state law ... is applicable if that law arose to govern issues
concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of con-
tracts generally. A state-law principle that takes its meaning
precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue
does not comport with this requirement of § 2."z'
Thus, any law governing an arbitration provision must apply equal-
ly to all other provisions of any contract.24 The state law must
also provide a ground for rejecting the contract, not merely an
arbitration provision."z Finally, and most important, the state law
cannot undercut the FAA."2
119. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1655-56 (1996). Prior to
its decision in Casarotto, the Supreme Court addressed this issue only sparingly in foot-
notes. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.11 (1984). The most complete
analysis of whether a given state law of contract formation is valid under the FAA was
Justice Stevens' dissent in Southland. See id. at 17-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). However, the Court rejected his reasoning, fearing that "states could
wholly eviscerate congressional intent to place arbitration agreements 'upon the same
footing as other contracts."' Id. at 16 n.11 (quoting H. R. REP. No. 96-68, supra note
30, at 1.
120. 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
121. Id. at 1656-57.
122. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
123. Id. at 493 n.9 (emphasis added).
124. See id. at 492-93 n.9.
125. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 n.11.
126. See Saturn Distrib. Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719, 726 (4th Cir. 1990).
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Lower courts applying state law of contract formation have
rendered decisions that demonstrate how difficult it is to distin-
guish between a valid application of the law of contract formation
and an invalid undercutting of the FAA. For example, in one of
the earliest cases discerning this difference, Supak & Sons Manu-
facturing Co. v. Pervel Industries, Inc.,127 the Fourth Circuit
struck down an arbitration provision contained in a sales confirma-
tion form." Under the relevant state law, since the arbitration
agreement was "a per se material alteration of the contract," '129 it
was not part of the original contract negotiations but was instead
an additional term.' The court considered and rejected the idea
that "holding an arbitration clause to be a per se material alter-
ation" was contrary to the FAA.' Instead, the court found that
the state law governing material alterations was a general rule of
contract formation permissible under the FAA.'
In subsequent cases, however, the Fourth Circuit has not been
able to persuasively maintain a distinction between permissible and
impermissible uses of state contract law. For example, it struck
down a Virginia statute that prohibited "automobile manufacturers
and dealers from entering into agreements that contain[ed] manda-
tory alternative dispute resolution provisions."' 3 The court ruled
that the validity of the Virginia statute depended on whether it
was "an unremarkable part of Virginia's general laws of contract
formation" rather than an "idiosyncratic rule specific to arbitration
agreements."'" In this case, Virginia did not generally "bar par-
ties from making certain provisions of their contracts nonnegotia-
ble.,,"3' Thus, the statute was an invalid singling out of arbitra-
tion agreements.'36 Two years later, however, the Fourth Circuit
held unenforceable an arbitration agreement between a public
127. 593 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1979).
128. See id. at 137.
129. Id. at 136 (citing Frances Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 204
S.E.2d 834, 841-42 (N.C. 1974); Marlene Indus. Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 380 N.E.2d
239, 242 (N.Y. 1978)).
130. See Supak & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Pervel Indus., 593 F.2d 135, 136 (4th Cir. 1979).
131. Id. at 137.
132. See id.
133. Saturn Distrib. Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719, 721 (4th Cir. 1990) (reviewing
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-550.5.27 (Michie 1989 Supp.)).
134. Id. at 725.
135. Id. at 726.
136. See id.
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school board and a construction company as ultra vires 7 The
Virginia legislature had granted all powers of contract to the
school board except the power to agree to arbitrate. 3 " The court
held that this did not run afoul of the FAA because laws defining
ultra vires acts are generally applicable.139
As these Fourth Circuit cases illustrate, it is difficult to deter-
mine when state laws of contract formation can invalidate arbitra-
tion clauses under the FAA. However, the Supreme Court's an-
nouncements regarding the validity of state arbitration law indicate
that the Fourth Circuit's generality test may be a starting point for
defining proper state laws of contract formation. Utilizing this test
to evaluate the validity of such laws is consistent with the FAA
and gives states an active voice in arbitration law. Allowing the
states this voice may quell the tension between state and federal
courts illustrated by Justice Trieweiler's special concurrence in
Casarotto v. LombardiP4 and by Casarotto's subsequent treat-
ment by the Supreme Court.'4'
III. CASAROTrO
In Casarotto v. Lombardi,'42 the Montana Supreme Court
expressed its concern that the FAA's preemptive effect would
invalidate statutes designed to protect Montanans from oppressive
contractual provisions.43 However, both the state Supreme Court
and the U.S. Supreme Court did not consider neutral Montana
statutes governing contract formation that could have been used to
invalidate the arbitration provision at issue in Casarotto.
The Casarotto case involved a dispute between parties to a
franchise agreement for the operation of a Subway sandwich fran-
chise in Great Falls, Montana. After the plaintiffs, the franchisees,
were denied a promised prime location for their store, they filed
suit for breach of contract in a Montana state court.' 44 The de-
fendant, Doctor's Associates, Inc., and its agent, Nick Lombardi,
137. See W. M. Schlosser Co. v. School Bd., 980 F.2d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 1992).
138. See id. at 256-57.
139. See id. at 259.
140. 886 P.2d 931, 939-41 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring).
141. 901 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
142. 886 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1994), vacated and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 2552 (1995); reaffd,
reinstated 901 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
143. See Casarotto, 886 P.2d at 939-41 [hereinafter Casarotto 1].
144. See id.
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moved to have the suit stayed pending the resolution of arbitration
pursuant to an arbitration clause in the parties' franchise agree-
ment. 45 The Montana District Court granted this motion.
The Supreme Court of Montana reversed on the ground that
the arbitration provision was not enforceable.'4 Montana law re-
quires all contracts that include arbitration provisions to note on
the first page of the contract, in underlined, capital letters, the
inclusion of an arbitration clause. 47 The Casarottos' contract had
no such notation on the first page; thus, under Montana law, the
Casarottos had received insufficient notice of the arbitration
clause."4 The Casarotto court identified the motivation for this
notice requirement: "[T]he legislative committee ... did not want
Montanans to waive their constitutional right of access to
Montana's courts unknowingly, and ... they were concerned
about Montanans being compelled to arbitrate disputes at distant
locations beyond the [state's] borders.' 4 9
The court further held that Montana's notice requirement was
not preempted by the FAA.5 The court explained that the no-
tice requirement did "not undermine the policies of the FAA" and
"that the FAA [did] not require parties to arbitrate when they
[had] not agreed to do so."'' Further, the United States Su-
preme Court could not "find it a threat to the policies of the
Federal Arbitration Act for a state to require that before arbitra-
tion agreements are enforceable, they be entered knowingly. To
hold otherwise would be to infer that arbitration is so onerous...
that it can only be foisted upon the uninformed."'5
In a special concurrence, Justice Trieweiler stated the court's
position more forcefully. He argued that Montana had a "so-
phisticated system of justice"'" made of statutes and rules that
145. See id.
146. See id. at 939.
147. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995). This statute provides:
Notice that a contract is subject to arbitration pursuant to this chapter shall be
typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract; and unless
such notice is displayed thereon, the contract may not be subject to arbitration.
Id.
148. See Casarotto , 886 P.2d at 933.
149. Id. at 935.
150. See id. at 938-39.
151. Id. at 938-39.
152. Id. at 939.
153. See id. at 939-41 (Trieweiler, 3., specially concurring).
154. Id. at 939.
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protects Montanans from "bad faith, fraud, unfair business prac-
tices, and oppression."'55 All of these carefully crafted rules,
however, were being undermined by the FAA.56 In Justice Trile-
weiler's words
due to [the federal judiciary's] misinterpretation of congressional
intent when it enacted the Federal Arbitration Act, and due to
their naive assumption that arbitration provisions and choice of
law provisions are knowingly bargained for, all of these procedur-
al safeguards and substantive laws are easily avoided by any
party with enough leverage to stick a choice of law and an arbi-
tration provision in its pre-printed contract and require the party
with inferior bargaining power to sign it."s
On appeal, the Supreme Court summarily vacated the Mon-
tana Supreme Court's opinion and remanded the case to Mon-
tana's highest court for consideration in light of its decision in
Dobson,'58 which considered whether the "involving commerce"
language used in § 2 of the FAA provided a limit on the scope of
the Act.5 9
On remand, the Montana Supreme Court reaffirmed its previ-
ous decision.' 6° The Court began its analysis by reiterating its
first opinion. It found that the goals and policies of the FAA were
not undermined by Montana's notice requirement' 6' and that the
"Supreme Court would not find it a threat to the policies of the
Federal Arbitration Act for a state to require that before arbitra-
tion agreements are enforceable, they be entered knowingly."' 62
The court then examined these findings in light of Dobson. It
summarized the holding in Dobson as giving the FAA preemptive
effect over all "transactions which, in fact, involve interstate com-
merce, even though a connection to interstate commerce may not
have been contemplated by the parties."' 63 The court then con-
cluded that "nothing in the Dobson decision ... relates to the
155. Id.
156. See id. at 940.
157. Id.
158. 115 S. Ct. 2552 (1995).
159. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
160. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 901 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1995) [hereinafter Casarotto 114.
161. See id. at 597.
162. Id. at 597-98 (quoting Casarotto I, 886 P.2d at 938-39).
163. Id. at 598.
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issues presented to this Court in this case"'" and upheld its pre-
vious decision.
On subsequent appeal, the Supreme Court restated its dis-
agreement with the Montana court's approach, reversing the
court's decision eight-to-one.'" In a very brief opinion, Justice
Ginsburg held that Montana's notice requirement was inconsistent
with the FAA."6 She explained that the goals of the FAA were
"antithetical to threshold limitations placed specifically and solely
on arbitration provisions."' 67 Further, the Montana notice re-
quirement singled out arbitration clauses and was therefore inval-
id."6 Justice Ginsburg did not address Justice Trieweiler's special
concurrence or his concerns for the citizens of Montana.
On remand (for the second time), the Montana Supreme
Court's defiance of the U.S. Supreme Court continued. Rather
than follow the Supreme Court's order to remand the Casarotto
case for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's
opinion, Justices Trieweiler and Hunt refused to sign a remand
order.169 Justice Trieweiler reasoned:
We cannot in good conscience be an instrument of a policy
which is as legally unfounded, socially detrimental and philosoph-
ically misguided as the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in this and
other cases which interpret and apply the Federal Arbitration
Act. 170
Although this protest will have no formal effect on subsequent
proceedings, it symbolizes the great frustration that some state
judges feel over the broad preemptive effect of the FAA.
IV. REVISITING CASAROTTO IN THE LIGHT OF
STATE LAW OF CONTRACT FORMATION
The series of state and federal opinions in Casarotto v.
Lombardi illustrates not only the tension between state and feder-
al courts over the role of state arbitration law, but also how state
164. Id.
165. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1654, 1655-57 (1996).
Justice Thomas was the sole dissenter in Casarotto.
166. Id. at 1657.
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. See Reuben, supra note 21, at 16.
170. Id.
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law of contract formation can relieve this tension. The concerns of
Justice Trieweiler could have been addressed without this conten-
tious and lengthy litigation. Justice Trieweiler's actions were moti-
vated by his concern that Montana's carefully crafted system of
protection for its citizens was being eviscerated by the FAA."'
Without safeguards such as a notice requirement, he said, you get
"a bunch of out-of-state corporations imposing arbitration on local
residents through clauses buried in contracts of adhesion."' The
true gist of his concern is a fear that unconscionable and adhesive
contracts could be foisted on Montanans.
This fear can be addressed in a manner consistent with the
FAA by using state law of contract formation to strike down trou-
bling arbitration provisions. In fact, Montana has in place statutes
and common law relating to unconscionability that might invalidate
the arbitration provision at issue in Casarotto and protect all Mon-
tanans from oppressive arbitration provisions in a manner consis-
tent with the FAA.
Montana courts have held that arbitration provisions, like all
other contractual provisions, are subject to the state's laws govern-
ing unconscionability.' 3 Pursuant to Montana's common law, ar-
bitration agreements are enforceable even if they appear in con-
tracts of adhesion, unless there is evidence that the agreement is
"oppressive or unconscionable."' 74 A contractual provision (or an
entire contract) is unconscionable and invalid under Montana law
if 1) "the contractual terms are unreasonably favorable to the
drafter" and 2) "there is no meaningful choice on the part of the
other party regarding acceptance of the provisions."'"5 To deter-
mine whether a particular contract is unconscionable, the courts
also examine factors such as unequal bargaining power, lack of
meaningful choice, oppression, and exploitation of the weaker
171. See supra note 153-57 and accompanying text.
172. Reuben, supra note 21, at 16 (quoting Trieweiler, J.).
173. Chor v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 862 P.2d 26, 30 (Mont. 1993) (finding
that the arbitration provision at issue was not unconscionable); Passage v. Prudential-
Bache Sec., Inc., 727 P.2d 1298, 1302 (Mont. 1986).
174. Chor, 862 P.2d at 30.
175. Leibrand v. National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co., 898 P.2d 1220, 1227
(Mont. 1995). These two elements are also reformulated as "oppression and disparity of
bargaining power." In re Estate of Russel Michael, Jr., 871 P.2d 272, 275 (Mont. 1994).
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party's vulnerability or lack of sophistication. 76 Ultimately, un-
conscionability is a question of law."
There are not enough facts in the Casarotto opinions to deter-
mine whether the particular arbitration provision in question was
unconscionable. However, Montana's general principles of uncon-
scionability are written such that their application in Casarotto
would not have been exceptional. After all, the Casarottos appear
to have been a weak and vulnerable party; they were forced to
open their Subway shop in a less-than-desirable location and were
ignored when prime locations for their store became available.178
These facts could indicate that the Casarottos were also forced
into an unconscionable arbitration clause.
Clauses that are unconscionable should be struck from a con-
tract. Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the Second Re-
statement of Contracts, courts can either refuse to enforce uncon-
scionable contracts or strike out specific clauses that are unconscio-
nable.'79 Montana law is consistent: if provisions of a contract
are found unconscionable, Montana courts have the option of
invalidating the entire contract, or the unconscionable provi-
sions.' 8°
Striking down an arbitration provision on grounds of uncon-
scionability should be allowed under the FAA. The Supreme
Court requires courts to treat arbitration provisions like all other
contractual provisions.' Thus, if all other contractual provisions
are subject to unconscionability laws, arbitration provisions should
also be subject to these laws. Otherwise, one of the fundamental
tenets of the FAA-that arbitration provisions should exist "upon
the same footing" as all other contractual provisions12---would
be violated.
176. See Kelly v. Widner, 771 P.2d 142, 145 (Mont. 1989).
177. See id.
178. See Casarotto 1, 886 P.2d 931, 932-33 (Mont. 1994).
179. See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1995); RESTATEMENT SECOND OF CONTRACTS § 208
(1981).
180. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-302 (1995). This section provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Kelly, 771 P.2d at 144-45 (applying this provision).
181. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989).
182. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has indicated in dictum that
state unconscionability laws must invalidate the whole contract, not
just the arbitration clause, in order to be a valid exercise of state
contract formation law under the FAA."s This dictum is anti-
thetical to the FAA and to general principles underlying uncon-
scionability. First, as noted above, requiring courts to invalidate an
entire contract if only a single arbitration provision is unconsciona-
ble would limit the court's options with respect to the arbitration
provision, thus placing arbitration clauses on grounds that differ
from other contractual provisions."
Second, requiring courts to invalidate an entire contract is
contrary to unconscionability principles. Unconscionability is an
equitable principle." Historically, courts in equity could not re-
scind contracts based on unconscionability; 86 they could only
stay the hand of those attempting to enforce such contracts."
Modem remedies for unconscionability reflect these equitable
principles. Underlying modem remedies is the notion "that a court
may withhold relief just as it might refuse specific performance,
not that a party may avoid the contract as he might for misrep-
resentation or duress."'" Further, courts usually refuse to enforce
particular clauses that are unconscionable and fashion remedies to
save the rest of the contract."l To deny courts this usual remedy
when an arbitration clause is at issue would ignore the origin of
the unconscionability doctrine and the modem law of remedies for
unconscionable contracts.
Other state law grounds, in addition to unconscionability, may
exist for invalidating the arbitration provision at issue in Casarotto.
Under Montana common law, contractual provisions that limit a
party's access to a Montana court are void. This general principle
was announced by the Montana Supreme Court in an 1899 opin-
ion, Wortman v. Montana Central Railway Co." In Wortman,
the court argued "that parties cannot stipulate beforehand to sub-
183. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.11 (1984).
184. See supra notes 92, 174-77 and accompanying text.
185. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACrs 302 (1982).
186. See id. at 306 n.16.
187. See id.
188. Id. at 309.
189. See id.; See also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976)
(formulating such a remedy).
190. 56 P. 316, 320-21 (Mont. 1899).
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mit their rights generally to the judgment of a designated third
person for final determination. The effect of such a stipulation
is ... to restrict parties from enforcing their rights under the
contract by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribu-
nals."'' This principle was later codified."9
A legitimate purpose underlies the Wortman decision and the
Montana statute that codified this decision: to invalidate forum-
selection clauses."9 The Montana courts and legislature have de-
veloped a public policy that disallows forum-selection clauses. This
policy furthers the Montana Constitution's statement that speedy
remedies must be afforded every person; forum-selection clauses
"impede the right to judicial process and especially discourage a
speedy remedy."' 94
This forum selection policy could have been used to invalidate
the arbitration provision at issue in Casarotto. The arbitration
provision in the Casarottos' franchise agreement required that the
arbitration take place in Connecticut. Thus, the arbitration pro-
vision served as a forum-selection clause that restrained the
plaintiffs' access to the Montana courts.'96 Invalidating the arbi-
tration provision would be consistent with Southland because the
forum-selection statute is a general rule, applicable to all contracts
and contractual provisions that have their basis in Montana com-
191. Id.
192. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (1995). This provision reads as follows:
Restraints upon legal proceedings void. Every stipulation or condition in a
contract by which any party thereto is restricted from enforcing his rights under
the contract by the usual proceedings in the ordinary tribunals or which limits
the time within which he may thus enforce his rights is void. This section does
not affect the validity of an agreement enforceable under Title 27, chapter 5
[Montana's Uniform Arbitration Act].
Id. See also Polaris Indus., Inc. v. District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 695
P.2d 471, 472 (Mont. 1985) (considering this statute).
193. Polaris, 695 P.2d at 473 (Sheehy, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 472 (Sheehy, J., concurring).
195. See Casarotto II, 901 P.2d 596, 597 (Mont. 1995).
196. See, eg., Smith v. Zepp, 567 P.2d 923 (Mont. 1977) (decided prior to the time
when the arbitration exception was included in the Montana code and holding that such
arbitration provisions would be invalid).
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mon law."9 As such, it is "grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.' 19
8
The forum-selection statute could be used in another way to
uphold Montana's notice requirement. There is one exception to
this statute's prohibition on forum-selection: all contractual provi-
sions formed pursuant to Montana's Uniform Arbitration Act 99
are valid and enforceable. The Montana forum-selection stat-
ute excepts all arbitration provisions that meet the general require-
ments of Montana's Uniform Arbitration Act.' In other words,
Montana's Act defines a system of arbitration that might otherwise
be invalid under the general forum-selection provision. Although
parties are funnelled into Montana's system of arbitration, in gen-
eral, arbitration is advanced because it is preserved. When the
whole system of Montana's laws are considered, the notice require-
ment defined in Montana's Uniform Arbitration Act is pro-arbitra-
tion-it makes possible an arbitration agreement that would other-
wise be invalid under general Montana law.
In sum, Montana's law of contract formation could have been
used to invalidate the arbitration clause at issue in Casarotto: the
clause appears to be unconscionable and violative of the state's
forum selection laws. Had the Montana Supreme Court in
Casarotto applied the state's contract law rather than the state's
arbitration law, it could have struck down the arbitration clause,
eased its concerns over adhesive contracts, and avoided the pre-
emptive reach of the FAA.
CONCLUSION
The broad scope of the FAA, combined with the U.S. Su-
preme Court's interpretation of its preemptive effect, has severely
restricted the ability of states to regulate arbitration agreements.
Although parties may individually "opt out" of the FAA, states
are denied an active voice in arbitration law. As illustrated by
197. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (stating that such provisions could be rejected upon
grounds applicable to all contract provisions); see also supra notes 110-18 and accompa-
nying text (arguing that the application of state law to this question is valid under
Southland).
198. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
199. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27 ch. 5. (1995).
200. See id. § 28-2-708 (1995).
201. See id.
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Casarotto v. Lombardi, this denial increasingly frustrates state
courts and legislatures that wish to protect their citizens from
arbitration provisions.
This Note has argued that such frustration can be relieved if
state courts and legislatures refocus on contract formation. The use
of state contract law to determine whether a valid arbitration
agreement has been reached could provide state legislatures and
courts with a way to address their concerns about arbitration
agreements while avoiding the preemptive effect of the FAA.
